Philosophy of the Body

Perspective

Morality

Very much connected to the psychology of objectification, is that of morality. Although all instances of external misrepresentation are preventable (within both a rational and consistent society), internal misrepresentations are not so easily confounded. Given that experience of objectification is in some sense inevitable, whence one's subconscious is chemically overcome with the presentation of an operative goal pertaining to some evolutionary power, what motivation have they to deny this illusion of humanity (whether physically substantive or fantastical)?

The psychological basis of morality

1. Survival

Basic morality can be derived from a simple genetic mechanism (survival of one's genes or those of one's species). An individual's desire and expectations for a more general (less conditional) morality however require explanation. High level morality can be defined as a form of altruism that may contradict one's evolutionary imperatives (the capacity of one's genes to carry on) even without a social contract to do so. Although high level morality requires an external basis to be real (absolute or accepted as traditionally defined), physical correlates can be found present in the brain (and its developmental capacity), as discussed below.

2. Emotion and Empathy

The most rudimentary psychological basis for high level morality is empathy (the intentional or unintentional placing of self in another's shoes and consequent feeling for them) - one does not wish to hurt another because it makes oneself feel bad. The effectiveness of this model is limited however by the health of dedicated emotional systems of the brain, including the capacity to regulate these.

3. Rationality and Belief

A more cognitive psychological basis for high level morality is based on a) self-awareness and b) the projection of one's self-awareness to another. The brain is biologically programmed (through evolutionary adaptation from a physical perspective) to be aware of itself (ourself) and is at least capable of awareness of other humans (selves) as "subject" (not-only-physical beings).

(The fact neurological activity happens to correlate with subjective consciousness - that this subjective consciousness is not just a belief held by the brain - is a separate issue and philosophical of nature. Yet the existence of a physical correlate for the subjective nature of consciousness suggests the existence of a physical correlate for the absolute nature of morality, such that if one's brain is right about what it believes in terms of consciousness, then it is equally right about what it believes in terms of morality. The fact morality, like consciousness, cannot be ontologically reduced to the physical universe is again a separate issue).

a) From our brain's sense of self as a "subject" (not-only-physical entity), we have a sense of appreciation of self (worth) that itself demands moral treatment. It can also be argued that this sense of self demands moral action - as if such a being were to only expect certain treatment - irrespective of its own actions - then it would lessen its sense of worth as a "subject" (not-only-physical entity) (as even animals without sense of self can behave immorally, but only animals with sense of self can behave with gene independent altruism or virtue). Such action would lessen its belief in self, which implies a direct association between immorality and eliminativism (or more specifically objectification). Therefore sense of self is diabolically opposed to both immoral treatment and action, while being enhanced by especially moral treatment and action (morale).

b) We are also capable of gaining a sense of appreciation of the subjective worth of others (based on a logical projection of our own mind's physical dependence), which too places rational demands on moral treatment (and action).

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